Macroprudential versus monetary blueprints for financial reform by Coombs, Nathan
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macroprudential versus monetary blueprints for financial reform
Citation for published version:
Coombs, N 2017, 'Macroprudential versus monetary blueprints for financial reform', Journal of Cultural
Economy, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 207-216. https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2016.1234404
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1080/17530350.2016.1234404
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Journal of Cultural Economy
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Cultural Economy on
28th October 2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/17530350.2016.1234404.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 26. Sep. 2019
1 
 
REVIEW ARTICLE 
Macroprudential versus monetary blueprints for financial reform 
 
Nathan Coombs 
 
School of Social and Political Science, 
University of Edinburgh 
15a George Square 
Edinburgh 
EH8 9LD 
nathan.coombs@ed.ac.uk  
 
Word count: 6,323 
 
  
2 
 
ABSTRACT 
New books by Avinash Persaud and Morgan Ricks present very different blueprints for 
financial reform. Persaud builds upon the macroprudential programme to advocate a role 
for regulators in shepherding risk throughout the financial system. Ricks rejects the direction 
taken by post-financial crisis regulation, offering a blueprint that addresses the panic-prone 
nature of money creation in shadow banking. This review article provides a reading of their 
books which demonstrates how their evaluations of the global financial crisis shape their 
policy prescriptions. It also suggests that although their blueprints are valuable thought 
experiments they have a number of lacunae which economic sociologists and political 
economists can help fill. In particular, I argue that questions concerning regulatory 
epistemology, the politics of regulatory reform, and simplicity versus complexity in 
regulatory rule-making might orient a productive empirical and conceptual research agenda. 
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Macroprudential versus monetary blueprints for financial reform 
 
Reinventing Financial Regulation: A Blueprint for Overcoming Systemic Risk, by Avinash 
Persaud, Apress, 2015, £20.20 pbk. ISBN: 9781430245575, 276 pp. 
The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation, by Morgan Ricks, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2016, $45.00 hbk. ISBN: 9780226330327, 336 pp. 
 
Those frustrated by the failure of public anger at financial scandals to gain political traction 
should have been relieved by the issue of financial reform taking centre stage in the 2015-16 
Democratic Presidential primaries. The platforms of the candidates could not have made for 
a starker contrast, with Bernie Sanders repeatedly referencing Hillary Clinton’s speeches to 
Goldman Sachs to present her as compromised candidate unable to see through meaningful 
change. That the politics of financial reform should prove a lightning rod for Sanders’s 
campaign is unsurprising; the bailout of the banks by the Federal Reserve in 2008 remains 
deeply unpopular. The unedifying spectacle of financial firms receiving billions of dollars in 
assistance while the housing market crashed and unemployment skyrocketed only 
entrenched suspicions that the regulatory apparatus is captured by Wall Street. Recently, 
memoirs by Timothy Geithner (2014) and Ben Bernanke (2015) have defended the bailouts 
as necessary to stem the tide of financial catastrophe. But the damage is done. Sanders thus 
won support by promising to see through a radical plan to break up the big banks, re-
establish the division between commercial and investment banking, and introduce a tax on 
financial speculation.  
However, the politics of regulatory reform can lend the impression that little has changed 
since the crisis, with business proceeding as usual after a few symbolic slaps across the 
wrists. Some scholars agree, seeing industry lobbying efforts as successful in watering down 
new regulation and leaving the financial system dangerously fragile (Admati and Hellwig 
2013). Yet the reforms introduced since the crisis were never likely to satisfy the political 
left and academic critics – and as such these voices rarely give credit to the innovations 
ushered in by central bankers and regulators. Reflecting the elite nature of the policy shift, 
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promoted by thinkers at the Bank for International Settlements (the central bank for central 
banks), the new regulatory paradigm in the United States and Europe goes by the unwieldy 
moniker ‘macroprudentialism’ (Crockett 2000; Borio 2003; Bank of England 2009; Hanson et 
al. 2011; Barwell 2013; Baker 2013). A still evolving conceptual framework with roots 
stretching back to the 1970s (Clement 2010), the originality of the post-crisis 
macroprudential programme lies in its attempt to mitigate systemic risk in the financial 
system as a whole. Where the conventional microprudential approach of banking regulation 
seeks to ensure the solvency of individual financial institutions, the macroprudential 
approach recognises that in a crisis situation banks simultaneously offloading assets can 
trigger fire sales, risk contagion, and a damaging credit crunch. A metaphor often employed 
to convey the gist of the idea is that of a line of dominos: due to increased 
interconnectedness in the financial system just one firm falling can set off a rapid chain 
reaction of bankruptcies and public bailouts. As Chief Economist at the Bank of England, 
Andrew Haldane (2009, 1), puts it, macroprudentialism is the ‘new ideology and a big idea.’ 
Especially significant is the heightened governance role macroprudentialism affords 
regulators. In keeping with Hyman Minsky’s (2016) account of the inherent instability of 
financial capitalism, macroprudentialism involves a retreat from regulatory deference to the 
market. Through central bank modelling of systemic risk and macro stress testing 
programmes (Langley 2013; Bank of England 2015), the idea is that regulators can know 
when a bubble is forming and tame the market through measures such as leverage caps and 
countercyclical haircut rules (Bank of England 2011; Constâncio 2016).1 For all their novelty, 
however, these regulatory innovations have not been introduced ex nihilo, but have been 
threaded into the existing patchwork quilt of institutions and rules. What would financial 
regulation look like if it could be designed from scratch? New books by Avinash Persaud and 
Morgan Ricks provide very different answers. Persaud wishes to see a more consistent 
application of the macroprudential toolkit, whereas Ricks sees that toolkit as overly complex 
and missing the instability of money creation in the era of ‘shadow banking’.  
                                                          
1 ‘Haircut’, in this context, refers to the amount of borrowing a firm will grant a borrower who is using a 
security as collateral. Since the value of securities can be highly volatile, firms may set the amount available for 
borrowing considerably lower than the value of the collateral. In periods of financial distress, financial 
institutions tend to increase haircuts, thus exacerbating market liquidity problems. Regulatory countercyclical 
haircut policies tighten minimum haircuts requirements during a perceived bubble and loosen them in a period 
of distress. 
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The purpose of this essay is to give an accessible introduction to debates about the future of 
financial regulation as encapsulated in the opposing views of these authors. The first two 
parts provide a reading of Persaud’s and Rick’s books. The third section identifies the limits 
of their blueprints for financial reform, suggesting how economic sociologists and political 
economists might fill their lacunae through a new empirical and conceptual research 
agenda. For at stake are important debates about regulatory epistemology, the politics of 
financial reform, and complexity versus simplicity in rule-making.  
 
Taming risk by unleashing it 
Second only to denunciations of ‘greedy bankers’ and ‘casino capitalism’, deregulation soon 
emerged as a prime suspect for the 2007-9 global financial crisis. If only the financial system 
had been more regulated, so the sentiment goes, then the crisis would have been less 
severe and the effects more transient. Indeed, there is scholarly agreement that a series of 
U.S. deregulatory ‘modernization’ Acts at the turn of the century were at least partly 
responsible for the growth of destabilising credit derivatives in the run up to the crisis (Funk 
and Hirschman 2014). The British ‘light touch’ regulatory regime was also far from blameless 
(Dorn 2015). Persaud, however, has long been arguing not only that financial regulation has 
become ineffective but that it may also be exacerbating financial instability (Persaud 2000). 
His book contends that what is needed is not tinkering at the edges of the regulatory edifice 
but rather its ‘substantial reinvention’. (p. 1) The foundations of his regulatory blueprint are 
threefold.  
First, Persaud steps back from the causes of the recent crisis and argues that the roots of all 
financial crises are behavioural. Boom and bust cycles are a natural consequence of the 
human propensity for ‘irrational exuberance’ (Shiller 2000) during the upswing and short 
memories on the downswing. During the good times investors ‘herd’ towards profitable 
opportunities, and there is little room for dissenting views to be expressed, let alone 
heeded. With Minsky (2016), Persaud argues that the inflation of asset prices during the 
upswing sets in motion a vicious circle of increasing leverage and risk-taking. And agreeing 
with Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Persaud sees financial crises as an invariant fixture of 
modern capitalism – one that cuts across varying social, political and legal regimes. 
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Second, in recognition of the ineluctable credit cycle, Persaud argues that regulators should 
aim to ‘embrace risk rather than try to ban it.’ (p. 52) The boom and bust cycle is not 
entirely detrimental, with the exaggerated sense of confidence engendered by the boom 
serving to channel funds towards ambitious projects. Another reason for embracing risk, 
Persaud argues, is that attempts to eliminate it only result in its reappearance elsewhere, 
usually in some harder to regulate corner of the financial system. No better are attempts to 
quantify risk – as with the value-at-risk models implicated in the global financial crisis – 
which simply amplify financial capitalism’s cyclical dynamics. The reasoning being that when 
market actors deem certain assets ‘safe’ during the bull market they are vulnerable to 
becoming overvalued and vulnerable to mass exit when bearish sentiment takes hold. This 
insight calls for a regulatory approach less focused on ‘statistical’ measures of risk and more 
on ‘structural’ measures. (p. 37)  
Third, Persaud makes the case that regulators’ role should be to direct risk to its most 
appropriate place. To do so requires recognition of three discrete types of risk: credit, 
liquidity, and market risks. Credit risk concerns the risk of debtors defaulting on loans; 
liquidity risk is the risk that securities may not be easily converted into cash; market risk 
relates to how the value of an asset may fall due to market movements. Persaud insists that 
these risks are not commensurable. For example, while a money market fund2 faces liquidity 
risks due to its reliance on short-term funding and deposits, a pension fund with long-term 
liabilities can easily absorb these risks. In Persaud’s view, regulators should therefore be 
seeking to channel different types of risk to their most appropriate place. Such shepherding 
should not be performed on a discretionary basis though. ‘Committees of the great and the 
good cannot easily act as guardian angels against financial crises.’ (Persaud 2015, 209) 
Humans are fallible and politics is capricious; fixed rules are needed in order to steer risk in 
the right direction (he notes that this has led him to be accused of ‘Stalinism’ by his critics). 
Keeping with these principles, the latter sections of Persaud’s book deliberate on a range of 
issues from bankers’ pay to accounting standards. He is particularly critical of the new 
European insurance regulation, Solvency II. Seeing it as a throwback to the discredited Basel 
II banking regulations, Persaud judges the requirement that insurance companies model risk 
                                                          
2 Money market funds provide investors with a safe place to invest in cash-equivalent assets. The funds 
maintain portfolios of short-term and liquid securities and monetary instruments (such as US Treasury bills and 
asset backed commercial paper).  
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on market prices as dangerously procyclical. On the question of whether to break up large 
banks, Persaud contradicts popular wisdom by arguing that smaller firms are more likely to 
herd by adopting homogenous modelling techniques. (The book arrives repeatedly at such 
counter-intuitive positions.) Elsewhere, Persaud reaches conclusions contrary to 
macroprudential norms. For instance, he sees central bank stress testing of the financial 
system being of limited use since the tests have to stop short of revealing failures which 
could ‘set off a bank run.’ (Persaud 2015, 68) On the controversial topic of financial 
transaction taxes, he concludes that arguments against them are ‘factually incorrect and 
disingenuous.’ (p. 175)  
So, how effective is Persaud’s book in setting out the case for regulatory reform? While I 
commend its ambition and avoidance of excessive jargon (for the most part), I also caution 
potential readers that this is a technical text in both substance and style. Scholars used to 
arguments elaborated in dialogue with the proper names of the canon might find frustrating 
such a no-frills account of financial governance. Indeed, Persaud’s conviction that 
‘regulation of the financial sector cannot be done through a single instrument’ (p. 3) may be 
a perfectly defensible position, but the results jar with an academic sensibility in search of a 
unifying argument and single take-home point. Like the macroprudential programme to 
which it contributes, Persaud’s blueprint for overcoming systemic risk is a complex machine 
of interlocking rules. It has multiple working parts and while underpinned by coherent 
principles is not reducible to them. As Barwell (2013, xi) also writes on the challenges facing 
macroprudential regulators: ‘There is no Grand Unified Theory that can synthesize these 
insight into a framework fit for policy analysis – nor is one likely to arrive in the near future.’ 
With that limitation in mind, Persaud’s book is what you might expect from a learned policy 
expert – an important voice worth hearing for those already signed up to the 
macroprudential programme, but one unlikely to inspire those who see in the above 
paragraphs only the alien discourse of regulatory technocracy.  
 
Monetary simplicity 
Former US Treasury advisor, Morgan Ricks, has a very different take on financial reform. His 
book, The Money Problem, contends that understanding what to do about financial 
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regulation entails re-evaluating the 2007-9 global financial crisis. In contrast to those who 
focus on the crisis's root causes – whether declines in profitability, global imbalances, or the 
mortgage debt bubble – Ricks argues that the panic in the money markets was the single 
most damaging event. In so doing he echoes the views of 19th century British essayist, 
Walter Bagehot, who argued that central bankers should focus on staving off a panic. What 
matters from this ‘money view’ (Mehrling 2011) perspective are not the causes precipitating 
the crisis but rather achieving the right regulatory response to ensure the soundness of the 
monetary plumbing. Today, Ricks claims, this insight requires directing attention to the 
problems with ‘shadow banking’.3  
It remains controversial whether the global financial crisis should be identified with the 
liquidity crunch in the shadow money markets or with deeper problems of leverage and 
debt in the banking sector. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, for instance, which was 
appointed by the US government to investigate the causes of the crisis, acknowledged the 
importance of liquidity problems in the money markets but concluded that that they were 
ultimately epiphenomenal (FCIC 2011). Other authors similarly object that 'liquidity 
narrative' explanations for the crisis are depoliticising and lean on suspiciously thin 
plumbing metaphors (Admati and Hellwig 2013, 211–12). Ricks, however, sides firmly with 
the liquidity narrative and argues that the panic in the money markets at the height of the 
crisis was responsible for most of the long-term economic damage. In Ricks's view, post-
crisis regulatory reforms have thus been labouring under a false diagnosis of the problem 
and headed in the wrong direction. As he puts it: ‘Panics are a centuries-old problem. They 
are not about cutting-edge developments in contemporary finance.’ (p. 26) He further 
argues that post-crisis regulation has become ‘mind-numbingly complex’ due to hinging on 
                                                          
3 ‘Shadow banking’ has been a central component of the money supply since the 1970s. Asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP – short-term debt issued by commercial institutions), repurchase agreements (‘repo’ 
– where brokers sell government securities to investors and buy them back the following day), and Eurodollar 
markets (where lending in dollars is provided by foreign banks) provide cheap, short-term funding to 
investment funds and banks. What makes it a ‘shadow’ banking practice is that it is not covered by federal 
deposit insurance guarantees. In the recent crisis the lack of guarantees against default became a problem 
once confidence collapsed in the mortgage-backed securities used as collateral for these instruments and fear 
gripped investors who declined to roll over these instruments. The Federal Reserve’s response was to step in 
as a lender of last resort, and, ultimately, as a ‘dealer of last resort’, making two-way markets in these shadow 
money instruments by taking unprecedented types and volumes of securities onto their balance sheet 
(Mehrling 2011, chap. 6). For more on the role of shadow money instruments in the financial crisis see Gorton 
and Metrick (2012). 
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the concept of systemic risk, which has ‘yet to be defined, let alone operationalized, in 
anything approaching a satisfactory way’ (p. xii). For that reason, Ricks rejects ‘the idea that 
skilled technocrats can somehow manage systemic risks to an acceptable level, as if turning 
dials on a complex machine’ (p. 252). 
Ricks's alternative blueprint for financial reform rests on tying a liquidity-panic explanation 
for the crisis to a theoretical intervention on the nature of money and how regulation might 
‘panic proof’ the money markets. Ricks begins the first part of his book by defending his 
understanding money as a short term IOU, finding support for his definition in the work of 
economists such as John Maynard Keynes. Advocating a twelve month maturity cut off point 
for understanding liquid debt as ‘money’, Ricks notes that this is somewhat arbitrary but 
aligns with the conventional demarcation between money and capital markets. Following 
this, he then seeks to demonstrate why shadow banking money markets involve a 
‘coordination game that is characterized by self-fulfilling bank runs’ (p. 53). From a game 
theoretic perspective he shows that while a bank-run is a non-optimal equilibrium, it is not 
irrational for depositors/lenders to withdraw their money if they expect others to do so. 
Next, Ricks examines banking theory, surveying existing functionalist theories and finding 
them lacking. He reaches the conclusion that what is distinctive about banks is that they are 
issuers of cash and cash-equivalents. In the final chapter of part one, Ricks defends the claim 
that panic-proofing should be the most urgent task of financial regulation. His evidence 
concerns the way that after 2007 the credit default swap (CDS)4 rate on issuer’s bonds 
diverged from the spreads on issuer’s bonds. He then maps the CDS-bond basis on to 
macroeconomic employment data to show a close correlation between panic-induced 
trends in the money markets and economic consequences in the ‘real’ economy.    
The book’s second part moves forward to ‘institutional engineering’ (Ricks 2016, 145). In 
Ricks’s blueprint, banks would be granted a license by the state to issue monies with 
maturities of less than twelve months (what he calls ‘r-currency’). All money would then be 
sovereign and non-defaultable, in return for which member banks would pay a seigniorage 
                                                          
4 A credit default swap (CDS) is a credit derivative that transfers the risk associated with a fixed-income 
instrument between two parties. Unlike a conventional insurance contract, a CDS can be written on the default 
risk of an instrument held by a third-party. The American International Group (AIG) became a central player in 
the global financial crisis by poorly evaluating the risk of mortgage-back securities when issuing CDSs and 
hence had to receive a $180 billion bail-out by government. 
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fee to the state. Regulatory requirements such as portfolio constraints and capital 
requirements could be dispensed with. More radically, there may not even be the need for a 
central bank. The following chapters go on to address the implications of the scheme: How 
can the money supply can be adjusted under an ‘r-currency’ system? What role might there 
might be for portfolio constraints and capital requirements? Would there need to be a 
lender of last resort? How can the seigniorage fees paid to the state be calibrated so that 
they neither inhibit the money supply nor provide a free-lunch to the banks entrusted with 
money creation? While Ricks sees his proposed system as removing the need for fine-
grained regulatory controls, one of his most striking suggestions is that monetary authorities 
should set the interest rate paid on deposits, reinstating the mechanism at the heart of 
Regulation Q which was phased out in the 1980s.5 The book’s final part then closes with 
more detailed examination of the ‘r-currency’ monetary blueprint, reflections on the 
ambiguities of regulatory rules, suggestions for steps toward bringing about the reforms, 
and further criticisms of the complexity of post-crisis financial regulation. 
Ricks’s book is thematically rich, theoretically bold, and conceptually elaborate. If a problem 
with literature on macroprudential regulation is that it is firmly embedded in technocratic 
discourse – making its insights relatively inaccessible outside of a small circle of policy 
experts – Ricks’s work shines in putting its insights into dialogue with sophisticated debates 
in the economics literature. There has been an outpouring of books on financial regulation 
since the crisis, but Ricks’s is the first to interrogate the subject from a fundamental 
monetary perspective. That said, the text’s synthesis of disparate literatures poses barriers 
to entry for the casual reader. What’s more, despite its elegant exposition, the book’s 
assumptions are contentious and its conclusions debateable. The final part of this review 
explores the limits of Persaud’s and Rick’s blueprints and shows how they point to 
compelling research questions which economic sociologists and political economists might 
wish to take up. 
 
Contesting reform: a research agenda 
                                                          
5 Regulation Q, part of the U.S. Banking Act of 1933, prohibited the payment of interest on demand deposits 
and imposed a ceiling on the interest that could be paid on savings and time deposits (the latter rule was 
repealed in 1986). For the historical sociology of the demise of Regulation Q’s interest rate ceiling see Krippner 
(2011). 
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Persaud and Ricks provide very different blueprints for financial reform. Most important are 
their conflicting views on the global financial crises. Persaud is close to the post-crisis 
consensus in regulatory circles which identifies the crisis as the latest episode in a recurrent 
financial cycle of debt and over-leverage. Ricks, in contrast, aligns with the late-modern 
tradition of central banking practices, seeing panics in the money markets as the true source 
of the problem. These conflicting accounts of the crisis are highly consequential. For if crises 
are the inevitable result of financial instability under capitalism then perpetual and fine-
grained regulatory oversight of the financial system is justified. If, on the other hand, the 
negative effects of crisis are associated principally with the growth of shadow banking since 
the 1970s then a more limited programme of institutional monetary design might suffice to 
resolve the problem.  
What then are the politics of these books’ policy prescriptions? As noted earlier, Persaud’s 
macroprudentialism does not involve granting regulators discretionary powers to 
micromanage the financial system. He instead seeks to qualify regulators’ powers by limiting 
them to stringent rule setting. But in so doing Persaud misses a bigger, albeit connected, 
problem. In either scenario, the macroprudential paradigm assumes that regulators can 
know when a bubble is forming and mitigate its excesses – a remarkable U-turn from the 
epistemological pessimism of Alan Greenspan, which held sway in regulatory circles prior to 
the crisis. Yet, a defence of this newfound confidence in regulatory knowledge is notably 
absent in Persaud’s book. Why should we believe that regulators are now capable of 
knowing the financial system and shepherding risk to the right places? As Barwell (2013, 
xiii), an author sympathetic to the macroprudential project, points out, ‘very little is known 
about how the financial system behaves in practice, how to measure let alone monitor 
systemic risk in real-time or how macroprudential interventions will influence system 
dynamics.’  
If Persaud glosses over these epistemic challenges, Ricks just rejects out of hand the notion 
that regulators can fine-tune risk in the financial system. Ricks casts doubt on the very 
notion of systemic risk as well as regulators’ capacity to know and control the build-up of 
such risk. In one sense, Ricks has the facts on his side. It is true that central categories of 
macroprudential regulation such as ‘systemic risk’ remain loosely defined and that the 
theory and practice of macroprudential policy is in its infancy. But there are still reasons for 
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optimism over a medium to long-term time horizon. For instance, Constâncio (2016) 
observes that even if individual quantitative methods for calculating systemic risk have not 
proven particularly useful in a predictive sense, aggregate indices have been shown to be 
more robust. And with ongoing research and model development in central banks, it is not a 
priori implausible that current knowledge gaps might be at least partially plugged in the 
future.  
Here I want to suggest that sociological research could make an important contribution to 
the debate. Since the early 2000s, a branch of economic sociology known as the social 
studies of finance (SSF) has shown how market knowledge is constructed through the use of 
technological devices and models (e.g. MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Callon et al., 2007). 
Although the field is best known for the notion of ‘performativity’ – how financial models do 
not represent financial reality but rather bring it into being – the wider focus is on epistemic 
practices in financial markets and their sociotechnical modalities. Curiously, though, SSF has 
mostly ignored regulatory knowledge practices (Coombs 2016). In particular, the raft of 
technologies supporting post-crisis macroprudential regulation – central bank stress tests, 
maps of the shadow banking sector, quantitative methodologies for measuring systemic risk 
– have yet to be interrogated by the field. To inform debate about regulatory epistemology, 
future work by economic sociologists might therefore wish to explore these emerging 
regulatory knowledge practices by putting their institutional, cultural, and technological 
dimensions under the microscope. With respect to stress testing and attempts to quantify 
systemic risk, this could build upon a stream of research in science and technology studies 
on economic modelling and forecasting (Evans 1997; Reichmann 2013). On regulatory 
attempts to map the shadow banking system, inspiration may be found in the field of 
theoretical cartography and questions raised by ‘post-representational’ accounts of 
mapping (Kitchin 2014).  
Another notable absence from both books is the question of political agency. Scholarship 
has demonstrated the limited ability of civil society actors to exert a democratic 
counterweight to financial sector lobbying (Pagliari and Young 2015). The voices of citizen 
groups tend to be marginalised by both their limited resources and knowledge deficit (what 
Williams (2013, chap. 7) calls the ‘politics of knowledgeability’). Thus, more ambitious 
programmes for regulatory reform are at a marked disadvantage. Not that one would know 
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this from Persaud’s book. In keeping with the elite nature of the macroprudential project 
(Baker 2013), politics is conspicuously missing from Persaud’s blueprint except as a 
hypothetical threat that might undermine the plans of well-intentioned regulators. Yet this 
suspicion of politics fails to recognise just how vulnerable the macroprudential project is. 
The global financial crisis created a window for ideational entrepreneurship at the elite 
regulatory level, but as memories of the crisis fade macroprudentalism is likely, if not 
already, facing political pressures to be rolled back. It seems unlikely that a regulatory 
project which threatens the profitability of major financial institutions can be sustained 
without some level of democratic support. In neglecting the politics of regulatory reform, 
Persaud’s book, like the broader macroprudential programme, is only affirming its fragility. 
Political agency does not play a large part in Rick’s blueprint either. Despite the seeming 
radicality of his sovereign money scheme, Ricks attempts to obviate its politics by stressing 
that it is ‘far from revolutionary’ and ‘essentially conservative’ (p. 242). He employs an 
analogy to support his argument that the proposed ‘r-currency’ scheme would not be a 
refoundation of financial regulation but rather a logical completion of federal deposit 
insurance guarantees. ‘[A]n otherwise sound computer program may be rendered crash-
prone by a few lines of corrupt code.’ (p. 243) As such, his scheme ‘might win support from 
large sections of the financial industry if it were accompanied by a major scaling back of 
financial stability regulation’ (p. 263). My suspicion here is that Ricks underestimates the 
scale of his proposed reforms. For example, Ricks suggests returning to something like 
Regulation Q, where interest rates are set by the monetary authority. Since this would bring 
interest rates back into the realm political contestation – a problem that the phasing out of 
Regulation Q in the 1980s sought to escape from (Krippner 2011) – it would surely provoke 
resistance. Moreover, Ricks’s envisaged bargain with the financial sector, involving 
acquiescence to monetary reform in return for scaling back financial stability regulation, 
appears to give force to Admati and Hellwig’s claim that the ‘liquidly narrative’ props up 
vested financial interests. There is increasing interest in monetary explanations for the crisis 
among political economists; in light of Ricks’s book, I would suggest that scholars investigate 
whose interests are aligned with different narratives of the crisis and their implications for 
the politics of regulatory reform. 
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The final major conceptual difference between Persaud’s and Rick’s visions concerns 
complexity versus simplicity in regulatory rule-making. As noted previously, Persaud stresses 
that there is no single solution sufficient for realising macroprudential regulatory reform. If 
regulators are not to curtail financial innovation then a certain complexity in rule-making is 
inevitable. Oppositely, Ricks stakes much of the appeal of his blueprint on its simplicity and 
how it will relieve regulators of the herculean challenge of governing systemic risk. But why 
should regulatory simplicity be a normative ideal? Ricks seems to endorse an aesthetic 
criterion and references the difficulty of teaching the ever-expanding volumes of financial 
regulation to students. And he is not alone in his concern with increasing regulatory 
complexity (Dorn 2015). Generally lacking throughout the literature, however, are well-
developed conceptual foundations for the preference for simplicity. One exception is 
Haldane (2012), who, on the basis of his reading of complexity theory, argues that fine-
tuned regulation is tied to the risk paradigm of neoclassical economics, whereas 
acknowledging uncertainty in economic life instead calls for simple rules. Haldane’s insights 
remain provisional though.6 Here again, then, it may be beneficial for economic sociologists 
to explore the practices in central banks and regulatory bodies in order to make an 
empirically-grounded contribution to the debate. 
Perhaps the most confounding problem of debates about regulatory complexity is that the 
word ‘complexity’ tends to be employed liberally without it often being very clear what it is 
referring to. For instance, does ‘complexity’ refer solely to the number of lines of legal code? 
Is the voluminous nature of the Dodd-Frank Act a register of its complexity? Or, 
alternatively, does ‘complexity’ describe the structural nature of policies and the 
sophisticated conceptual and technological tools employed by regulators in their attempts 
to know the financial system? For example, is the conditional value at risk (CoVaR) 
methodology developed to calculate systemic risk a sign of complexity? The above are 
clearly quite different regulatory complexities, but they tend to be rolled into one another in 
existing debates. Datz (2013) has written on the role of ‘complexity’ in narratives of the 
financial crisis. I would suggest that it would be fruitful for political economists to 
interrogate the role of ‘complexity’ in normative discourses of regulatory reform. This might 
                                                          
6 Barwell (2013, 182), for instance, objects that such ‘big picture’ thinking obscures the reality that most 
sources of systemic risk are not discernible from macro-aggregates, and hence require microscopic 
investigation for their detection and mitigation. 
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involve discourse analysis, analytic clarification of the concept, or genealogical 
reconstruction of the discourse of simplicity versus complexity in regulatory debates. 
Persaud’s and Ricks’s books are distinguished crucially on the question of 
complexity/simplicity in regulatory rule-making, but more in depth research on the topic is 
needed to clarify the stakes of the debate.  
 
Conclusion 
Avinash Persaud’s and Morgan Ricks’s books clarify the major differences between 
macroprudential and monetary blueprints for financial reform. Persaud builds upon the 
macroprudential programme to advocate a role for regulators in shepherding risk 
throughout the financial system, whereas Ricks offers an alternative blueprint that 
addresses the panic-prone nature of money creation in shadow banking. As a contrasting 
pair of thought-experiments, their texts therefore bring to the surface important conceptual 
and empirical questions concerning the causes of the global financial crisis and what 
governments and regulators can do to prevent, or mitigate, its repetition. For that reason, I 
can fully recommend both books to scholars interested in this policy area. Debates about 
regulatory reform tend to be elite in nature and only rarely analysed by scholars outside the 
economics profession. These books may help makes those debate somewhat more 
accessible to a broader range of social scientists. 
The final part of this review addressed the limits of the books’ blueprints and asked how 
economic sociologists and political economist might make a contribution to surpassing 
them. In particular, I suggested that regulatory epistemology, the politics of financial 
reform, and simplicity versus complexity in regulatory rule-making are areas of contention 
that could orient a productive conceptual and empirical research agenda. These themes 
were brought out by the books under review, but they also speak to wider debates 
unfolding in the regulatory sphere that hitherto have not attracted enough attention. Social 
scientists are often happier to analyse regulatory developments than contribute to shaping 
the policy debate – and I do not mean to suggest that sociologists and political economists 
take the lead in policy advocacy. At the very least, however, they are well-placed to make an 
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important contribution towards informing and shaping the debate. The research agenda 
ideas outlined by this review essay are intended to promote that ambition. 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that no matter how controversial the ideas discussed by 
this review article may be, they are ultimately directed towards shoring up the status quo. 
Since both Persaud’s and Rick’s texts are concerned exclusively with financial stability, 
bigger questions concerning how finance might be brought to democratic account, or how 
the distributional consequences of financialized capitalism can be remedied, are not part of 
the agenda. That might frustrate those inspired by the more radical proposals for financial 
reform proposed during Sanders’s Democratic primary campaign. But if there are to be 
regulatory initiatives directed towards realising new articulations or finance and society they 
will have to start somewhere. Existing blueprints for reform are a good place to begin. 
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